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COMMENTS
CONSOLIDATION OF COUNTY AND CITY FUNCTIONS
AND OTHER DEVICES FOR SIMPLIFYING
TENNESSEE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
WALLACE MENDELSON*
I. INTRODUCTION

The growth of urban population beyond the legal boundaries of our
towns and cities presents problems that are not being handled effectively by existing agencies of local government. Essentially the
difficulty is that, while the suburbanites are an integral part of the
central city's social and economic life, they are beyond her legal
jurisdiction. As a result county government, designed primarily for
rural areas, finds itself bogged down with urban problems. To meet
such incongruities suburbanites often seek satisfaction of their needs
in a series of uncoordinated special service districts, or other public or
semi-public agencies and often ultimately in separate municipal incorporation. In short most of our urban centers are governed not by
one, but by numerous more or less independent, uncoordinated, overlapping layers of local government. The result is confusion and
conflict of authority, divided responsibility, high costs, uneven services, frustration of popular understanding and control, bitter antagonisms and decay of the central city due to the exodus of wealth and
talents into suburbia, leaving costly blighted areas "in town" and
an ever growing responsibility for "daylight populations" that bear
little of the tax burdens involved.
One solution for such problems is the expansion of city limits by
annexation of "built-up" or urbanized adjacent territory.' But annexation will often be politically or economically impractical and in any
case leaves at least two layers of local government-county and city.
Another device for simplifying local government is consolidation
in whole or in part of city and county government. This in turn would
obviate the need for the other governmental agencies which tend to
develop in fringe areas at the outskirts of our large municipalities. The
essence of this approach is the integration or merger of the city and
county into a single governing unit either for the performance of all,
or of selected, functions. A related, but different device, is the inter* Professor of Political Science, University of Tennessee.
1. See Tenn. Pub. Acts 1955, c. 113.
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governmental agreement. Under this device both county and city
maintain their fully separate and independent status, but by contractual arrangements provide for the joint administration of selected
services or functions. The purpose of the present paper is to examine
the possibilities of existing Tennessee law with respect to consolidations and contractual arrangements for the simplifying of local governmental operations.
II.

CONSOLIDATION OF CoUNTY AND CITY FUNcTIONS

Amendment No. 8, added to the Tennessee Constitution in 1953,
provides that "the General Assembly may provide for the consolidation of any or all of the governmental and corporate functions now or
hereafter vested in municipal corporations with the governmental or
corporate functions now or hereafter vested in the counties in which
such municipal corporations are located; provided, such consolidations
shall not become effective until submitted to the qualffied voters
residing within the municipal corporation and in the county outside
thereof, and approved by a majority of those voting within the
municipal corporation and by a majority of those voting in the county
outside the municipal corporation."
It will be noted that, in contrast to Amendment 6 (par. 3), this
Amendment does not specify that the General Assembly must act
by "general law." Indeed Amendment 8 is virtually a verbatim copy
of one of the recommendations of the Frierson Commission2 except
that it omits the "general law" requirement which the Commission
had included. Such an omission must be deemed meaningful. It
follows that those who gave us Amendment 8 must have intended that
consolidations could be accomplished either by general or by private
3
act of the General Assembly.
No general legislation authorizing consolidations has been enacted
in Tennessee since the adoption of Amendment 8. Thus at least until
such a measure is provided private act consolidation seems permissible.
But this presents two special problems, both of which grow out of
Amendment 6 restrictions on private legislation. Under this new
constitutional provision no private act can be effective unless by its
terms it requires approval by popular referendum or by a twothirds vote of the legislative body of any municipality or county
affected thereby. 4 Thus a private consolidation act, since it would
2. REPORT OF CONSTITUTION REVIsIoN COMMISSION, STATE OF TENNESSEE
(1946).

37

3. Amendment 7 prohibits all private acts with respect to home rule
municipalities.
4. The Amendment reads as follows:
"The General Assembly shall have no power to pass a special, local
or private act having the effect of removing the incumbent from
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affect both a county and a city, would no doubt have to be approved
by both-either by two-thirds vote of the city and the county legislative bodies or by referenda. The latter might cause trouble! Strictly
two separate "elections" would have to be held, one for city voters and
another for voters of the county which includes city voters. In practice this perhaps need mean only that city and extra-city votes would
have to be separately tabulated. Any attempt at a short-cut by one
county-wide vote would certainly invite challenge.
Then to compound the difficulty Amendment 8 requires referenda for
consolidations-city voters must approve and county voters who live
outside the city must approve before consolidation can be effected.
Approval by city voters of a privateconsolidation act per Amendment
6 would at the same time appear to meet in substance the requirements of Amendment 8. But the same cannot be said as to county
voters! For Amendment 6 contemplates all county voters, whereas
Amendment 8 contemplates only those county voters who live outside the city. In short, private act consolidations would involve
multiple elections at best. But to say this perhaps is to say merely
that a single county-wide referendum would in substance meet all the
requirements of both Amendments provided only that votes be
separated and tabulated in such manner as to disclose the wishes
of (a) county voters (b) city voters and (c) county voters residing
outside the city. Some of this complexity could be eliminated, of
course, by avoiding the referenda of Amendment 6, i.e., by resorting
to approval by the local legislative bodies. But the two-thirds vote
requirement there might be a political stumbling block.
Another problem arises under the "anti-ripper" provision of Amendment 6. Under it no private act "having the effect of removing the
incumbent from any municipal or county office or abridging the term
or altering the salary" of a municipal or county officer can be valid.
Yet the normal effect of a consolidation of city and county functions
would be to abolish at least some county or city offices-the whole
point of consolidation being to abolish overlapping, duplicatory government. This difficulty might be met by taking care that consolidation should not become operative until the end of the term of office
of any person who would be adversely affected, or by "buying off"
all possible objectors. The former escape would be something of a
problem in the case of a board or commission having staggered terms.
any municipal or county office or abridging the term or altering the
salary prior to the end of the term for which such public officer was
selected, and any act of the General Assembly private or local in
form or effect applicable to a particular county or municipality either
in its governmental or its proprietary capacity shall be void and
of no effect unless the act by its terms either requires the approval
by a two-thirds vote of the local legislative body, of the municipality
or county, or requires approval in an election by a majority of those
voting in said election in the municipality or county affected."
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Of course, it is possible that the courts might hold that despite its
broad language the "anti-ripper" amendment should not be construed
to affect bona fide, locally approved governmental reorganizations.
Aside from the foregoing problems Amendment 8 is so general in
its terms as to invite conflicts of interpretation as to just what forms
of consolidation it authorizes. On this matter it is worth noting
that the amendment clearly was inspired by the Frierson Commission
proposal and that the latter in turn was derived from a 1924 Amendment to the Georgia Constitution 5 since repealed. The Frierson
group virtually copied the first few sentences of that Amendment,
inserted a "general law" requirement, and substituted the terms "any
or all" for the term "all" in describing the quantity of functions that
might be consolidated. The Commission omitted the remaining provision of the Georgia Amendment which makes it clear that in
Georgia, consolidation was to be accomplished only by private act
and only by transferring all municipal and county functions to a
new city-county unit co-extensive geographically with the pre-existing
county. The breadth and generality of the Frierson proposal, and
hence of the Tennessee Amendment, surely must be deemed purposeful! Deliberate failure to adopt the limiting provisions of the
Georgia Amendment (or something similar) must be considered an
intentional grant of broad discretion to the General Assembly in
consolidation matters-subject to the severe restraints imposed by
the dual referendum election requirements. In short, the restraints
imposed are political rather than legal.
This brings us to a crucial problem springing from the Amendment's
language which on its face could be held to permit consolidation only
by transfer of functions from cities to counties. This would preclude
such common consolidation devices as the shifting of functions from
counties to cities, or from both city and county to a third agency.
The Georgia Amendment from which the crucial language was
drawn clearly contemplated only transfers of all municipal functions
and all county functions to a new city-county entity. It is significant
that this limited amendment has since been replaced in Georgia by
a much broader one. Our Amendment makes no mention of a new
third unit to which both city and county functions may be transferred. It must be interpreted to permit such consolidations, however,
unless we are to make the unreasonable assumption that those who
gave us this Amendment contemplated transfers of "any or all" functions of great metropolitan cities to county governments designed
to handle only essentially rural affairs.6 Surely it is generally under5. GA. CONST., art. XI, § 2a.
6. It is assumed here, and throughout this paper, that such provisions
respecting counties as are found in Articles VII and X of the Tennessee
Constitution do not impose restrictions or limitations upon the consolidation
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stood that consolidation, if not exclusively, is primarily a metropolitan
area concern. In short, it would be unreasonable to suppose Amendment 8 was designed only for smalltown and county problems.
While on its face this Amendment seems to contemplate only a
shifting of functions away from cities, it does not say so unequivocally.
Moreover there appears to be no ground in reason or history that
would dictate such a one-way policy. Indeed Georgia itself has since
abandoned that limitation. The fact that the Frierson Commission
dropped that part of Georgia's 1924 Amendment which clearly spells
out the one-way limitation suggests an intention to insure more
flexibility for Tennessee. Thus in the absence of a clear prohibition,
in the absence of any contrary grounds in history or reason, and in
view of the apparent intention of the Frierson Commission, our
courts may well permit two-way consolidations, i.e. transfers to, as
well as from, cities.
Another device for accomplishing at least the results of consolidation
is the unilateral abandonment of a function by a city and the assumption thereof by a county. Of course this involves at least two legal
problems-may the function in question be dropped by the one and
may it be legally picked up by the other? 7 The answer to such questions will depend upon the nature of the function and the existing
general and private acts relating to the city and county involved. 8
But apart from the issue of legality, there are practical considerations
which may be controlling. A city, for example, might be authorized,
but not required, to operate a rabies control program. Having established such a program, the city might for one reason or another
see fit to give it up. The mother county,.whether specially authorized
or not, in order to protect its own rabies control system might feel
compelled to take over. Of course the same thing might be done
conversely. In either case, with or without mutual agreement, a
simplification of local government would be accomplished without
special legislative authorization.
We do not suggest that either city or county should take advantage
of a special situation to force its proper functions upon others. The
point rather is that in many circumstances governmental simplification can be accomplished to the mutual satisfaction of all concerned
without special legislative sanction or elaborate referenda-unless, of
course, it is ultimately held that such acts constitute "consolidations"
within the meaning of Amendment 8. It could be argued that unof county and municipal functions. Or to put it differently such provisions
are superseded by Amendment 8. This assumption, of course, may be unwarranted.
7. A case in point was abandonment by the City of Nashville, Tennessee, of
its health function and assumption thereof by Davidson County in 1953 before
Amendment 8 became effective. The cost of this function for the entire
county is now paid by the county.
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ilateral acts of the kind in question are not "consolidations." On the
other hand the consolidation amendment could be construed as, an
effort to forbid one local government from foisting its functions off
upon others without their consent. There appears to be no basis in
the background of the Amendment for the latter construction.
In summary,- then, it appears that a reasonable interpretation of
Amendment 8 would permit consolidation of any or all county and
municipal functions either by general or by private act, through
creation of a new governmental agency to replace a pre-existing
county and city for all or for only limited purposes, or instead of
consolidating functions in a new third agency, by consolidating them
either in the pre-existing city or county. 8

III. EXISTING GENERAL STATUTORY PROVISIONS FOR SIMPLIFYING
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SHORT OF CONsOLIDATION

Prior to the consolidation amendment general legislation had been
enacted in Tennessee for the expediting of local government by contractual arrangements between cities and counties. These measures
will be explored below, but at the outset the problem of their compatibility with Amendment 8 must be considered. Is a city-county
agreement for the administration by the county of all city and
county schools a "consolidation"? If so, it would appear that legislation authorizing such an arrangement without the dual city and county
referenda required by the amendment would be invalid. Certainly
.it may be argued that such contractual arrangements are essentially
different from "consolidations" (see above) and so do not fall within
the referenda requirements of Amendment 8. On the other hand
there are at least some surface similarities between the two devices.
It follows that courts might be induced to strike down any legislation
purporting to authorize contractual transfers of functions between
city and county, if such legislation did not provide for referendum approvals.
The sounder position, one suggests, is that Amendment 8 was
not calculated to alter the existing device for simplifying local government by contractual arrangement. Rather its purpose was to
authorize something new which might otherwise have been constitutionally vulnerable. That something new was consolidation
which, unlike the contractual approach, changes the nature of the
parties thereto, not merely their administrative responsibilities.
a. Generaland School FunctionArrangements
8. See Consolidation-Complete or Functional-of City and County Governments in Kentucky, 42 Ky. L. J. 295, 297-98 (1953).
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A Tennessee statute provides as follows:
"The quarterly county court of any county and. the chief legislative
body of any municipality that lies within the boundaries of said
county are hereby authorized and empowered to enter into any
such agreements, compacts, or contractual relations as may be desirable or necessary for the purpose of permitting said county and
said municipality to conduct, operate, or maintain, either jointly
or by one agency for the other, desirable and necessary services or
functions, under such terms as may be agreed upon by the two
agencies." 9
This is clearly the broadest existing Tennessee legislation on the
problem at hand. It purports to cover all municipal and county functions and permits contractual arrangements for either joint operation,
or operation by one agency for another. There appears to be no decision by any court of record concerning it. There is, however, another provision in the Tennessee code which seems to impose a
limitation with respect to "separate [municipal] school systems."' 0 The
latter, according to this provision, may not be transferred without a
referendum, but the law is far from clear as to whether such referendum is to be city-wide, or county-wide, or perhaps county-wide
excluding the city.
Another peculiarity of the latter statute is that no contractual agreement is specified. For all that appears, upon approval by referendum,
a city may transfer "administration of such town or city school system
to the county board of education and county superintendent of
education" without consent by either of the latter.
The same act "authorizes," but does not require, the transferring
municipality to devote its school funds "to the payment of the
proportionate part of the cost of the maintenance and operation
of such schools.""
Other provisions of the same measure relate to the operation by,
and duties of, the county school officials to whom such schools are
transferred, and the handling of municipal school funds and indebted12
ness.
Finally, the statute makes all that has been said above also applicable to transfers by special school districts to county school
boards and superintendents. 13
In connection with the foregoing, Section 2515 of the Tennessee
Code 14 (enacted in 1925) should be mentioned. It authorizes "county
9. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1939, c. 222, § 1, TENN. CODE ANN. § 10268.14 (Williams
Supp. 1952).
10. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1949, c. 40, § 1, TENN. CODE ANN. § 2397.1 (Williams
Supp. 1952).

11. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 2397.2, 2397.5 (Williams Supp. 1952).
12. Id., §§ 2397.3, 2397.4.

13. Id., § 2397.2.
14. TENN. CODE ANN. § 2515 (Williams 1934).
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and town boards of -education and special school district boards" by
mutual agreement "to operate the school or schools of such town
under the general supervision of the county superintendent." No
referendum is mentioned. A proviso requires that nothing therein
shall be construed to change "the general method of distribution of
county and state school funds between the county and such towns
on the basis of the average daily attendance as provided in this statute. ..

"15

16
Conversely to the foregoing, Section 2393.16 of the Tennessee Code
authorizes contracts whereby "county high school may be taught
in... private or city schools; provided, that the high school branches
be taught free of charge to all pupils of the county entitled thereto"
and provided also that the authority of the state commissioner, county
superintendent and all public school officers shall be as full and ample
in such schools as in other county high schools. No referendum is
required.

b. Hospitals
Counties and municipalities are authorized jointly or separately
to contribute funds for hospitals in accordance with the following
statutory provisions:
Any county or incorporated municipality of this state is hereby
empowered and authorized to make contributions of property or
money from the public funds of any such county or municipality,
or of both, to any general welfare corporation established under the
laws of this state, and engaged in acquiring, erecting, building, constructing, enlarging or repairing any hospital of this state which
serves the citizens and residents of any such county or municipality,
without regard. to race, creed or color and which is not operated for
private profit, without regard to whether such hospital is located
within or without the territorial limits of any such county or municipality.17

The statute provides that in making such contribution counties and
cities shall act by resolution or ordinance. 18
c. Joint RecreationalSystems
Provision for joint recreational systems is provided for as follows:
Any two or more municipalities may jointly provide, establish,

maintain and conduct a supervised recreation system and acquire
property for and establish and maintain playground,

recreation

centers, and other recreation facilities.19
15. Ibid.
16. TENN. CODE ANN. § 2393.16 (Williams 1934).
17. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1949, c. 177, § 1, TENN. CODE ANN. § 4432.39 (Williams
Supp. 1952).
18. Id., § 4432.41.
19. Id., § 3516.5, Tenn. Pub. Acts, 1937, c. 307, § 5.
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The term "municipality" as used in this act includes counties. 20
d. Health
Each municipality of 5000 or more in population is required to
have a board of health, but cities are authorized to cooperate with
counties in maintaining county departments of health, presumably

on an expense-sharing basis.
Every municipality, having five thousand, inhabitants and. over shall
organize a properly constituted board of health, which, in addition
to their duties as such local boards, shall also make monthly,
quarterly, semiannual, and annual reports to and in accordance with
such form and instructions as the commissioner of public health may
prescribe, and also shall make special reports whenever required.2 '
Municipalities in any county in which a county department of
health may be so established are authorized to co-operate in the
maintenance of such county department of health; and where any such
municipality may elect to enter into an agreement with the county
for the maintenance of a county department of health, such county
department of health shall also serve as the department of health
for such municipality.2
Municipalities which may be located in counties so establishing
county departments of health are empowered to cooperate in the
maintenance of such county departments of health, and to have such
county departments of health serve as departments for such municipalities, are authorized to incur the expenses necessary for their
proportionate part in the establishment and maintenance of such
county departments of health, and to levy and collect such taxes
upon all of the property within the jurisdiction of such municipalities, as may be necessary to meet and pay the same.23
e. Miscellaneous Provisions
In addition to elaborate and detailed provisions for joint city and
county airports2 4 and the simpler provision for joint erection and
control of bridges,5 Tennessee law authorizes Regional Planning
Commissions.26 Membership thereon is to be designated by the
State Planning Commission and may include members of both county
courts and municipal legislative bodies. The purpose of such a commission is to "make and adopt a general regional plan for the physical
development of the territory and region" including "municipal territory. 2 7 Also cities are authorized to adopt a Regional Planning Commission as their own municipal planning agency.2
20. Id., § 3516.1; see Hart v. Knox County, 79 F. Supp. 654 (E.D. Tenn. 1948).
21. TENN.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

CODE

ANN.§ 5770 (Williams 1934).

Id., § 5784.
Id., § 5788.
Id., §§ 2726.13-2726.22.
Id., § 3028.
Id., §§ 552.14-552.23.
Id., § 552.17.
Ibid.

